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ABSTRACT
International financial integration has received much attention among 
professional investors. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between financial integration and industry and firm-
specific characteristics through analysing cross-listing premiums 
(determined by the price difference between American Depositary 
Receipts (A.D.R.s) and their underlining stocks) in Japan. Employing 
autoregressive models to examine convergence speeds of a shock 
to the price difference and non-linear Band-threshold autoregressive 
models to identify non-arbitrage bands, we find that firms integrate 
well when they are larger in size, sales growth, turnover, performance, 
institutional holdings, or marked by merger activity, overseas 
subsidiaries, industrial or consumer goods industries, and a longer 
history of A.D.R. listing. That is, the A.D.R. with the abovementioned 
characteristics tends to have less scope for arbitrage. However, cross-
market premiums for firms which have large shareholders and a 
larger extent of earnings management converge more slowly and 
have longer half-lives, implying more arbitrage opportunities exist. 
The explanatory variables applied explain over 35% of variance of 
premium, and most of the variables remain significant determinants 
of half-lives whether autoregressive or threshold autoregressive 
modules are used, but firm leverage is not. The results show that the 
metals and mining industry converges notably slower than other 
industries, indicating arbitrage is possible.
1. Introduction
Financial integration decreases the cost of capital (Bailey & Jagtiani, 1994); increases eco-
nomic growth (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2007); mitigates agency problems 
and enhances governance quality (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulze, 2004). There are numerous 
well-documented studies which investigated financial integration amongst several equity 
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markets (Gochoco-Bautista & Mapa, 2010; Law, 2008). However, the literature reports a neg-
ligible role of the specific firm characteristics that influence financial integration. Diverting 
from current studies discussing the national level of financial integration, this study drills 
down to the specific features of firm level-affected financial integration and cross-listing 
premium. There are no existing studies demonstrating the kinds of firm-specific charac-
teristics, industry, corporate governance factors, or American depositary receipt (A.D.R.) 
features that affect financial integration, cross-listing premiums, half-lives (i.e., convergence 
speeds of a shock to the cross-listing premium), and no-arbitrage bands (i.e., zones where 
deviations between an A.D.R. and its related stock prices are not arbitraged away). This 
study looks at firms’ features that cause the price-based evidence of financial integration. 
It is thus a first attempt to operationalise financial integration at firm level.
The Japanese stock market is world’s second largest. The behaviour of the cross-listing 
premium from A.D.R. and its underlying stock provides a useful price-based measure of 
integration. In particular, Japanese firms possess special features (Tsuji, 2012), and are the 
second biggest issuers of depository receipts (D.R.) after the U.S. As a way for U.S. investors 
to diversify their investment portfolio internationally, a Japanese A.D.R. represents owner-
ship in a Japanese company, trades as conventional shares on U.S. exchanges, and provides 
identical cash flows as its underlying home stock (Alsayed & McGroarty, 2012). If the U.S. 
stock market is efficient, the price of an A.D.R. should trade at parity. More specifically, in a 
fully integrated market, the cross-listing premium should be approximately zero. Full inte-
gration of A.D.R. and its underlying Japanese stock might be disrupted by firm or industry 
factors, because the benefits of dual listing tend to be firm-specific (Alaganar & Bhar, 2004). 
What and how do Japanese firm characteristics affect the cross-listing premium? What 
are the important determinants of the specific industry and firm characteristics affecting 
financial integration? This paper provides empirical answers to these questions and clarifies 
some interesting aspects relating to possible arbitrage opportunities.
We extend the existing literature to establish 14 hypotheses (see Section 3). In the empir-
ical analyses, first, we measure the cross-listing premium between Japanese A.D.R.s and 
their underlying stocks. Second, following Yeyati, Schmukler, and Horen (2009), we employ 
traditional autogressive (A.R.) models to calculate the convergence speed of a shock to the 
cross market premium as (inverse) measures of the degree of international financial inte-
gration (i.e., half-life). In addition, we interpret both the band-width and the convergence 
speed as (inverse) measures of integration by non-linear threshold autoregressive (T.A.R.) 
models to implicitly characterise a compensating premium for typical transaction costs such 
as brokerage fees, as well as to estimate no-arbitrage bands (i.e., zones where deviations 
between A.D.R. and stock prices are not arbitraged away) and convergence speeds outside 
the band (Yeyati et al., 2009). Third, by way of the non-linear Band-threshold autoregressive 
(Band-T.A.R.) results, we focus on the asymmetric adjustment and no-arbitrage bands, and 
identify the firms’ specific characteristics, corporate governance, industry, and A.D.R. fea-
tures that determine the convergence speed of financial integration and no-arbitrage band.
The work that comes closest to our study is Yeyati et al. (2009). We augment their study 
and contribute to the existing literature in two aspects. First, we consider that the study of 
the firm level of the Japanese case is critical, because most of the related studies probe at 
regional level, such as Asian economies (Caceres & Unsal, 2013). Japan has a well-developed 
market in which the government controls of cross-country capital movement are fewer com-
pared with controls of emerging markets, such as government restrictions on capital flow, 
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government corruption. Therefore, most of the explicit barriers can be on the whole ruled 
out. In this study, we expect that the degree of integration between A.D.R. and its underlying 
Japanese stock returns is diverse from different firm features. Also, inferences referring to 
average sector effects may not necessarily hold at the firm level (Manjón-Antolín, 2010). 
Which firm, A.D.R. features, and industry affect arbitrage opportunity? Taking Japanese 
firms as examples, we examine whether cross-listing premiums exist within a highly devel-
oped market.
Second, most of the international financial integration literature examines limited firm 
features. For example, Yeyati et al. (2009) find that liquid A.D.R.s and their parent stock 
prices’ deviations across markets are rapidly arbitraged away and no-arbitrage bands are 
narrow. Lucey and Zhang (2011) uncover that corporate leverage is negatively related to 
integration. This study probes more inclusive features of firms that influence the phenom-
ena of international financial integration. In this way, we can address several important 
questions at once, instead of discussing only a firm’s capital size or an individual leverage 
variable. Few studies explore the relationship between financial integration and firm-specific 
attributes and industry that result in possible arbitrage opportunities. Hence, this study 
sheds light on some debates on how firm-level factors affect firms’ international financial 
integration, allowing investors and analysts to exploit investment opportunities and to 
diversify investment portfolios.
Following Aslanidis, Osborn, and Sensier’s (2010) study on co-movement in monthly 
stock returns, we investigate the monthly cross-listing premiums from 10/2001 to 9/2010 
for 33 stocks in Japan with A.D.R. listings. Our analysis shows that firms characterised 
by a larger size, sales growth, turnover, better firm performance, institutional holdings, 
merger activity, overseas subsidiaries, industrial or consumer goods industries, Level 2 or 
3 A.D.R., a longer history of A.D.R. listing, or listed in the N.Y.S.E. or Nasdaq market are 
able to integrate well (i.e., smaller absolute cross-listing premium, shorter half-life, nar-
rower no-arbitrage band); we believe this is because the informativeness of firm-specific 
characteristics largely decreases investor information asymmetry. On the other hand, the 
cross-listing premium for firms with more large shareholders and a larger extent of earn-
ings management converges more slowly, and has larger half-lives and wider no-arbitrage 
bands. Moreover, most of the variables remain a significant determinant of the half-lives 
and threshold regimes, but firm leverage does not. Furthermore, the metals and mining 
industry converges more slowly than other industries, indicating arbitrage is still possible.
2. Literature review
Financial integration may be affected directly or indirectly by factors related to the nature 
of the firm and its industry (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Yeyati et al. (2009) find that liquid 
A.D.R.s and their parent stock prices’ deviations across markets are rapidly arbitraged 
away. Lucey and Zhang (2011) uncover that corporate leverage is negatively related to 
integration. Yeyati et al. (2009) offer evidence that large firms are fully integrated with the 
international financial system. Phylaktis and Xia (2006) report that the increasing industry 
effects on international financial integration are not confined to the Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications sectors, and thus are not considered a temporary phenomenon. Faias 
and Ferreira (2017) pinpoint the important linkage between international stock return 
co-movements and institutional ownership. Karolyi (2004) reveals that negative spillovers 
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are associated with smaller A.D.R.s, with less-liquid O.T.C. listing and Rule 144a, compared 
with large ones listing on the N.Y.S.E. and Nasdaq markets. 
Previous studies investigating factors influencing international financial integration sug-
gest firm characteristics, corporate governance, industry features and A.D.R. features could 
play important roles. Many studies identify that size (Hong, Torous, & Valkanov, 2007; 
Yeyati et al., 2009), sales growth (Roosenboom & van Dijk, 2009; Bekaert et al., 2007; Chan 
& Lakonishok, 2004; Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992), volume turnover (Grammig, 
Melvin, & Schlag, 2005; Koumkwa & Susmel, 2008; Yeyati et al., 2009), firm performance 
(Jegadeesh & Livant, 2006; Lee, Shleifer, & Thaler, 1991; Lee & Zumwalt, 1981), and corpo-
rate leverage(Lucey & Zhang, 2011; Smith & Watts, 1992) are the crucial firm characteristics 
that are most likely to affect international financial integration.
Some studies evaluate the effect of corporate governance such as the presence of large 
shareholders (Admati, Pfleiderer, & Zechner, 1994; Jian, Tingting, & Shengchao, 2011; La 
Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Wiwattanakantang, 2001), level of institutional 
shareholders (Faias & Ferreira, 2017; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Chidambaran & John, 2000), 
and earnings management (Barron, Standard, & Yu, 2009; Sun, 2009) on international 
financial integration. Other studies justify the impact of industry features such as merger 
activity (Baker & Savasoglu, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005), overseas subsid-
iaries (Dhawan, 1997; Owhoso, Gleason, Mathur, & Malgwi, 2002), and specific industries 
(Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulze, 2006; Espinoza & Kwon, 2009; Moerman, 2008) on international 
financial integration. Much research emphasises the potential effect of A.D.R. features such 
as levels of A.D.R. Level 2 or 3 A.D.R.s, A.D.R. size, and history on international financial 
integration (Hales & Mollick, 2014; Karolyi, 2004; Lee, Chang, & Chen, 2015). The afore-
mentioned literature provides a solid foundation to probe more inclusive features of firms 
that may influence the phenomenon of international financial integration. Next, we discuss 
and develop the hypotheses for the linkages between financial integration and firm char-
acteristics, corporate governance, industry, and A.D.R. characteristics.
3. Hypotheses development
3.1. Firm characteristics
Hypotheses 1–5 are associated with five selected firm characteristics measured by size (log 
of the year-end equity), sales growth (the percentage of change in sales), volume turnover, 
return on equity (R.O.E.), and leverage. These five hypotheses are derived from previous 
studies such as Lucey and Zhang (2011), Yeyati et al. (2009), Roosenboom and van Dijk 
(2009), Koumkwa and Susmel (2008), Bekaert et al. (2007), Hong et al. (2007), Jegadeesh 
and Livant (2006), Grammig et al. (2005), Chan and Lakonishok (2004), Lakonishok et al. 
(1992), Smith and Watts (1992), Lee et al. (1991), and Lee and Zumwalt (1981), and are 
shown below:
Hypothesis 1: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with firm size.
Hypothesis 2: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with firm growth.
Hypothesis 3: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with turnover.
Hypothesis 4: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with firm performance.
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Hypothesis 5: The degree of financial integration is negatively associated with corporate leverage.
3.2. Corporate governance
Hypotheses 6–8 are related to three selected corporate governance variables: the presence 
of large shareholders, level of institutional shareholders, and earnings management. These 
hypotheses are generated from previous studies, such as Faias and Ferreira (2017), Jian 
et al. (2011), Barron et al. (2009), Sun (2009), Gillan and Starks (2003), Wiwattanakantang 
(2001), Chidambaran and John (2000), La Porta et al. (1999), and Admati et al. (1994), and 
are shown below:
Hypothesis 6: The presence of large shareholders has no effect on financial integration.
Hypothesis 7: Higher levels of financial integration are associated with a higher level of insti-
tutional shareholders.
Hypothesis 8: Higher levels of financial integration are associated with a lower level of earnings 
management.
3.3. Industry features
Hypotheses 9–11 are based on three selected industry variables: merger activity, overseas 
subsidiaries, and specific industries. These hypotheses are proposed based on previous 
studies such as Espinoza and Kwon (2009), Moerman (2008), Doidge et al. (2006), Moeller 
et al. (2005), Baker and Savasoglu (2002), Owhoso et al. (2002), and Dhawan (1997), and 
are listed as follows:
Hypothesis 9: The presence of merger activity is no impact on the degree of financial integration.
Hypothesis 10: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with overseas 
subsidiaries.
Hypothesis 11: The degree of financial integration is negatively associated with the specific 
industries.
3.4. A.D.R. characteristics
Hypotheses 12–14 are associated with three selected A.D.R. characteristics: Level 2 or 3 
A.D.R.s, A.D.R. size, and history. These hypotheses are derived from previous studies, such 
as Lee et al. (2015), Hales and Mollick (2014), and Karolyi (2004), and are listed below:
Hypothesis 12: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with Levels 2 or 3 
ADRs.
Hypothesis 13: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with NYSE- and 
NASDAQ-listed ADRs compared with those that are OTC-listed.
Hypothesis 14: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with the history of 
ADR listing.
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4. Data and the cross-listing premium
4.1. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study are obtained from DataStream and Compustat databases. The 
cross-listing premium and half-lives were calculated during the period from October 2001 
to September 2010. Monthly data are used in this study because this allows us to neglect 
the issue of non-contemporaneous trading days and non-overlapping trading hours. When 
focusing on firm-level data by half-lives, we selected Japanese A.D.R. samples for our inves-
tigation because not only do they have relative merits for economic significance, but they 
could also isolate possible government intervention. In addition, Japanese A.D.R. sam-
ples rule out the limitations of international presence. As our samples come from a single 
stock market (i.e., Japan), the exchange rate influence, that is not the focus of this study, is 
neglected. Firms must satisfy the following three criteria for inclusion in our study samples. 
First, Japanese public firms with Level 1, 2 and 3 A.D.R.s listed before 2003 are used for 
investigation. Since we are interested in different A.D.R. types resulting in different extents 
of integration, Level 1 A.D.R.s traded in O.T.C. are also included in our analysis. Rule 144a 
issues trading only among qualified institutional buyers on the P.O.R.T.A.L. system are 
discarded. Second, stocks that present irregular patterns in the time series, for example, 
displaying large unexplained shifts in trading volume, are excluded. In addition, we further 
impose a minimum number of observations to estimate reliably the A.R. and Band-T.A.R. 
models; that is, stocks that have at least 90 months of observations for A.R. and Band-T.A.R. 
analyses. Third, this study gathers A.D.R.s which have price, stock price, exchange rate, and 
A.D.R.-related data in the DataStream database. There are also underlying stock data in the 
Compustat database, such as stock capital, sales, turnover, R.O.E., leverage, large shareholder 
percentage, institutional holding percentage, earnings management, merger, overseas and 
industry data. After eliminating firms for which required data are missing, the final sample 
for our analysis contains 33 firms.
For each firm, we collect four categories of firm-level data, that is, five financial features 
(size, sale growth, turnover, R.O.E., and leverage), three corporate governance features 
(large shareholder percentage, institutional holding percentage, and earnings management), 
three industry features (merger activity, overseas subsidiary, and industry classification), 
and three A.D.R. features (A.D.R. type, market listing, and A.D.R. effective day). The oper-
ational definitions of these variables are as follows: firm size is scales by average equity in 
thousand. Growth is the percentage of change in sales. Turnover is the value of total shares 
traded divided by market capitalisation. R.O.E. is the return on equity defined as the amount 
of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders equity. Leverage is calculated as 
total debt divided by total equity. Large shareholder is the percentage of stock holdings by 
large shareholders. Institutional holding is the percentage of stock holdings by institutions. 
Earnings management is the discretionary accruals divided by total assets. We set the merger 
dummy variable as equal to one if firms engaged in merger activity, and zero otherwise. 
The overseas dummy is equal to one if firms have overseas subsidiaries. Three industry 
dummies are used to classify four industries (i.e., industrial, consumer goods, metals and 
mining industries). We set Level 2 and 3 A.D.R. type dummy equal to 1, Level 1 zero. The 
A.D.R. market exchange is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the A.D.R.s are listed in 
N.Y.S.E. or Nasdaq and zero for the O.T.C. exchange. A.D.R.s are split into A.D.R. effective 
dates in the 1970s, 1990s are equal to one, and others are zero in order to capture the impact 
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of A.D.R. listing history on financial integration. We also account for the effects of financial 
integration by controlling all regressions for indicators of A.D.R. size (the amount of total 
A.D.R. share) and A.D.R. liquidity (i.e., A.D.R. turnover, which is calculated by A.D.R. price 
times A.D.R. traded share). Table 1 provides information about the list of 33 firms in our 
sample. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics.
4.2. The cross-listing premium
The cross-listing premium (or discount) reflects the deviation between the market price of 
the parent stock and its price in the U.S. It is computed by converting the local currency 
price of the underlying stock into U.S. dollar prices, multiplying this by the number of 
underlying shares that one A.D.R. represents, and then dividing the value by the A.D.R. 
price. When financial assets can be transferred freely between the parent market and the 
Table 1. summary of empirical data for aDRs. 
source: Datastream database.
Firm No. DR Issue ADR Type Exchange Industry ADR Effective Date
1 advantest 2  nYsE tech. hardware and equip-
ment 17/09/2001
2 all nippon airways 1 otc travel and leisure 28/11/2000
3 Belluna 1 otc General retailers 20/12/2001
4 canon 3  nYsE tech. hardware and equip-
ment 01/01/1979
5 Eisai 1 otc Pharmacy and biotechnology 1/12/1995
6 hitachi 3  nYsE Electronic and electric 
equipment 11/03/1982
7 honda 3  nYsE automobiles and parts 01/01/1977
8 kawasaki 1  otc industrial engineer 6/11/1997
9 kewpie 1  otc Food producers 18/02/1998
10 kobe steel 1 otc industry metals and mining 01/10/1992
11 konami 3  nYsE Leisure goods 30/09/2002
12 kubota 3  nYsE industrial engineer 01/01/1976
13 kyocera 3 nYsE Electronic and electric 
equipment 13/05/1980
14 makita 3 nasDaQ household goods 01/04/1991
15 minebea 1  otc Electronic and electric 
equipment 11/04/1997
16 mitsubishi 2 nYsE support services 01/07/1994
17 mitsubishi UFj Fin. 2  nYsE Banks 02/04/2001
18 mitsui 3 nasDaQ support services 01/12/1970
19 nidec 2  nYsE Electronic and electric 
equipment 27/09/2001
20 nippon 3  nYsE Fixed line telecom 01/09/1994
21 nomura 3  nYsE Financial services 17/12/2001
22 ntt Docomo 2  nYsE mobile telecommunication 01/03/2002
23 olympus 1  otc Leisure goods 01/06/1993
24 orix 3  nYsE Financial services 16/09/1998
25 Panasonic 3 nYsE Leisure goods 01/01/1970
26 Ricoh 1  otc tech. hardware and equip-
ment 01/04/1991
27 sekisui house 1  otc household goods 28/03/2001
28 shiseido 1  otc Personal goods 01/07/1992
29 sony 3  nYsE Leisure goods 01/01/1970
30 sumitomo metal 1  otc metals and mining 01/07/1993
31 sumitomotrust 1  otc Banks 30/04/1998
32 toyota 3  nYsE automobiles and parts 28/09/1999
33 Wacoal 3 nasDaQ Personal goods 01/12/1997
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U.S. market, transaction costs are negligible, and the two markets close at the same time, 
then the cross-listing premium should be close to zero, if the market is fully integrated 
(Yeyati et al., 2009). Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the cross-listing premium 
Table 2. summary statistics of firm characteristics.a
aFirm size is scales by average equity in thousand. Growth is the percentage of change in sales. turnover is the value of total 
shares traded divided by market capitalisation. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total equity. Large share-
holder is the percentage of stock holdings by large shareholders. institutional holding is the percentage of stock holdings 
by institutions. Earnings management is the discretionary accruals divided by total assets.
source: authors calculation.
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
size 90,596.227 18,546.758 1003.967 1,350,000 236,000
Growth (%) 10.224 7.329 −1.376 24.518 22.351
turnover (%) 3.616 1.474 0.324 341.701 62.219
R.o.E. (%) 10.445 3.412 −2.147 17.293 36.228
Leverage (%) 105.736 64.267 22.935 203.156 55.881
Large shareholders (%) 40.157 32.136 2.472 89.213 41.725
institutional holding (%) 17.329 7.239 3.162 32.587 24.127
Earnings management (%) 32.4 12.4 2.1 88.4 24.561
Table 3. summary statistics - each company’s cross-listing premium.a
athe table shows summary statistics for the cross-listing premiums (%), defined as the percentage difference between the 
dollar price of the stock in the domestic market and the price of the corresponding D.R. in the U.s. ‘all stocks’ denotes the 
simple average of all the stocks in the sample.
source: authors calculation.
No Firm Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs.
1 advantest −0.252 −0.144 1.437 0.456 3.900 109
2 all nippon airways −0.413 −0.339 4.967 −0.168 7.637 121
3 Belluna −0.051 0.269 1.653 −1.119 6.525 102
4 canon 0.013 −0.070 1.249 1.514 8.143 121
5 Eisai −0.491 −0.497 5.117 9.514 4.325 121
6 hitachi 0.062 −0.059 1.074 −0.053 4.911 121
7 honda −0.080 −0.132 1.363 −0.389 5.743 121
8 kawasaki 1.515 0.905 8.315 2.017 15.241 121
9 kewpie 1.577 0.452 11.124 8.353 14.835 121
10 kobe steel 4.019 4.025 11.338 2.263 29.300 121
11 konami −0.400 −0.352 1.361 −0.328 3.767 96
12 kubota 0.232 −0.050 1.385 −0.165 3.612 121
13 kyocera 0.236 −0.432 1.075 0.246 4.188 121
14 makita 0.689 0.610 1.885 3.843 9.738 121
15 minebea 1.615 0.430 10.234 9.514 10.961 121
16 mitsubishi 1.992 2.991 4.828 −0.250 4.992 121
17 mitsubishi UFj Fin. −0.174 −0.169 1.534 −0.198 6.589 114
18 mitsui 0.217 −0.030 2.113 2.280 11.910 121
19 nidec −0.107 −0.284 1.466 0.775 6.905 109
20 nippon −0.502 −0.501 0.687 −3.048 12.992 121
21 nomura 0.455 −0.292 3.900 6.261 17.330 121
22 ntt Docomo 0.340 −0.108 3.575 6.214 6.254 121
23 olympus −0.912 −0.901 0.836 −0.347 12.892 121
24 orix −0.123 −0.173 1.290 0.326 8.211 121
25 Panasonic −0.131 −0.100 1.258 −1.877 13.828 121
26 Ricoh 1.013 0.805 9.629 0.907 7.656 121
27 sekisui house −0.211 0.025 4.933 −1.889 8.672 121
28 shiseido −0.793 −0.798 2.267 3.457 15.943 121
29 sony 0.245 0.022 1.824 2.284  15.536 121
30 sumitomo metal 4.014 3.993 9.859 3.857 28.086 121
31 sumitomo trust 0.816 0.405 4.833  1.241  10.969 121
32 toyota −0.034 −0.089 1.149  0.441  7.160 121
33 Wacoal 0.552 0.494 1.899  0.822  7.824 121
all stocks 0.383 −0.154 1.299 2.191 6.271 3918
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of the sample firms. Due to space limitations, we do not interpret these statistics in detail. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of these statistics is available upon request to the authors.
4.3. Unit-Root tests
If the cross-listing premium data are I(1), then the standard statistical inference may suffer 
from the spurious regression-type critique (Granger & Newbold, 1974) and the half-life of 
the deviations would be too long to allow for any meaningful discussion in terms of financial 
integration. Therefore, various unit root tests (such as D.F.-G.L.S. and N.P. tests) confirm 
that the cross-listing premium series follow a I(0)/stationary process. Because of limited 
space, we do not report these results. Nevertheless, the results for these tests are available 
upon request to the authors.
5. Models and methodology
5.1. Linear regressions
The linear regression model estimated by the generalised least squares technique is used to 
gauge the effects of firm characteristics, corporate governance, industry, and A.D.R. char-
acteristics on international financial integration(measured by firm i’s estimated half-life) 
in order to validate our proposed hypotheses (described in Section 3). Therefore, the inde-
pendent variables include firm characteristics, corporate governance, industry, and A.D.R. 
characteristics described in Section 4.1, and the dependent is the firm i’s half-life generated 
by the A.R. and Band-T.A.R. models. We now introduce both A.R. and Band-T.A.R. models.
5.2. AR model
Financial integration through the law of one price (L.O.O.P.) can be measured using two 
models. The first consists of a traditional linear A.R. model. Following Yeyati et al. (2009), 
higher convergence speeds reflect a quicker convergence to the L.O.O.P. and hence strong 
financial integration. We estimate the persistence of stocks applying the Augmented Dickey–
Fuller model, with one autoregressive component and another lagged difference – that is, 
we estimate the following model:
 
where α measures the change in the premium to differences between the price of the under-
lying stock and the price of the A.D.R. Put differently, α offers a measure of the speed of 
convergence of the premium back to its equilibrium value. Here, 2t  is the variance of the 
process. The model includes Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(G.A.R.C.H.(p,q)) effects to account for heteroskedasticity prevalent in the data. Lags 
Xt = 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are included so that no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity is present in the residuals. 
Specifically, in each A.R. model the number of lags and G.A.R.C.H. terms vary such that 
there is no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity left in the residuals. The half-life meas-
ures the time it takes for a deviation from the premium to dissipate by 50% and is calculated 
by ln(0.5)/ln(1+α) (Ha & Fan, 2004). This expression assumes a monotonic rate of decay, 
which does not necessarily occur in higher-order A.R. models.
5.3. Band-T.A.R. model
The second type of model we utilise is the non-linear Band-T.A.R. model. The Band-T.A.R. 
model was first proposed by Tong (1978) and further developed by Tong and Lim (1980). 
The non-linear models are well supported by theoretical arguments based on international 
transaction costs or sunk costs of international arbitrage (Sercu, Uppal, & van Hulle, 1995). 
The existence of transaction costs implies the existence of two different regimes, an arbi-
trage and a no-arbitrage regime. If the difference between the two prices is smaller than the 
transaction costs, then an arbitrage will not take place and the difference can persistently 
exist. However, when a shock in either of the two markets results in a difference between the 
two prices that exceeds the transaction costs (i.e., the premium is outside the no-arbitrage 
band), then it triggers profitable arbitrage trades that elicit a strong pressure on the pre-
mium to go back inside the band. In other words, theoretically there will be a no-arbitrage 
regime when the persistence is high, and an arbitrage regime when there exists pressure 
on the price to converge. To the extent that high transaction costs, and hence a broader 
band of a no-arbitrage regime, are associated with a lower degree of financial integration, 
the estimated width of the no-arbitrage bands provides a measure of effective integration. 
Following Yeyati et al. (2009), the Band-T.A.R. specification we estimate is the following:
Where
 
This model is known as the Band-T.A.R.(k, 2, de), where k is the augmented lag length, 2 is 
the number of thresholds, and de is the delay parameter. We assume that the thresholds are 
symmetric and that the dynamics of the process outside the threshold are the same regardless 
of whether there exists a premium or a discount. Moreover, we set de equal to one, βin and 
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βout represent the convergence speed in the no-arbitrage and arbitrage regimes, respectively, 
Vup is the upper threshold, and Vlow is the lower threshold. We assume that constants in 
both regimes are zero. For each firm, we estimate a different model, where k, p, and q are 
set such that the residuals do not contain any serial correlation or heteroskedasticity (p is 
the number of A.R.C.H. terms and q is the number of G.A.R.C.H. terms).
The model is estimated following the procedure described in Obstfeld and Taylor (1997). 
The estimation proceeds via a grid search on the threshold, which maximises the log likelihood 
ratio (L.L.R.). As the threshold is not defined under the null, the standard inference is invalid 
and L.L.R. does not follow the usual χ2 distribution. To derive the critical values of the L.L.R. 
test, we follow Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) and use Monte Carlo simulations. The empirical 
distribution of the L.L.R. can then be calculated from the 1000 simulations, and this is used as 
the basis for the inference in judging the alternative Band-T.A.R. model against the A.R. null.
6. Empirical results
6.1. Estimated half-lives and threshold regimes
We examine the extent of financial market integration through the L.O.O.P. by conducting 
A.R. and Band-T.A.R. models for each firm, and the results of implied half-lives for A.R. 
and T.A.R. as well as the estimated T.A.R. thresholds are reported in Table 4. As indicated 
in Table 4, we find that the average half-lives (from the A.R. models) range from 0.014 
in Kubota to 2.743 in Sumitomo Metal. The average half-lives tend to be lower than 1 in 
the majority of A.D.R.s. A similar pattern is observed in the case of the T.A.R. estimates. 
Kubota and Kobe, both belonging to the steel and metal industry, appear the two largest A.R. 
and Band-T.A.R. half-lives, signifying that specific-industry arbitrage opportunity exists. 
In contrast, cross-listing premiums for Kubota (industrial engineer industry) and Honda 
(automobiles) are the quickest to converge to zero in both A.R. and Band-A.R. half-lives. 
The faster the convergence is for premiums, the more efficient the pricing is in the A.D.R. 
and underlying markets, implying fewer arbitrage opportunities. Note that for 11 out of 33 
firms, when using the non-linear model it takes less than 0.1 months for the A.D.R. price 
premium to be reduced by half. From the non-linear estimation, we find faster adjustments 
for all the firms. For the non-linear models, the estimated average half-life is 0.486 months, 
which is smaller than that of the linear model at 0.614 months. By allowing non-linear 
adjustments, the average half-life is reduced by approximately 21% compared with the 
standard linear model, indicating non-linear Band-T.A.R. models fit well across all firms.
In Table 4, a positive correlation between A.R. half-life and the threshold width signifies 
that slowly reverting industries tend to have larger thresholds. The no-arbitrage bands range 
from 0.023% in Honda to 1.444% in Sumitomo Metal. This means that the cross-listing 
premium in Sumitomo Metal can move between –1.444% and 1.444% without arbitrage 
taking place in the market. Once outside the inaction-band, arbitrage happens very quickly, 
with a typical half-life less than a month. It is important to note that these results might 
not just imply that Honda is more integrated with U.S. market than Sumitomo Metal. 
As explored in the next section, deviations from the L.O.O.P. might be affected by the 
above-mentioned stock, A.D.R., and industry specific factors. Thus, to study the relative 
integration of different A.D.R.s one has to compare A.D.R.s with different characteristics. 
Yeyati et al. (2009) note that if non-linearities are present in the evolution of the cross-listing 
premium, then convergence speeds should be slower when estimated by the A.R. models 
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than by the Band-T.A.R models. The phenomenon is the same in our findings. Furthermore, 
the wider the band-width is, the higher the persistence estimated by the A.R. That is, the 
results offer further evidence of how the presence of non-linearities influences the results 
from a linear estimation.
6.2. Convergence speeds of integration and firm-specific characteristics
This part of the analysis investigates the dependence of the conditional persistence of the 
cross-listing premium (that is, convergence speeds or half-lives). In Table 5, the persistence 
of the premium outside of the thresholds co-varies notably negatively with firm size, growth 
rate, turnover, performance, and its interaction variables, except for leverage. As to the 
corporate governance variables, large shareholders and earnings management are positively 
significant in explaining the persistence of the premium outside of the thresholds, while 
institutional holdings are negatively significantly related to the persistence of the premium, 
indicating that institutional holdings increase integration, while large shareholders and 
earnings management decrease integration. The premiums for firms with a larger size, 
growth, turnover, better performance, and more institutional holdings take a shorter time 
Table 4. Results for half-Lives of the linear model (a.R.), non-linear model (Band-t.a.R.), and estimated 
thresholds.
source: authors calculation.
Firm A.R.Half-life Estimated Band-T.A.R.Threshold (%) Band-T.A.R.Half-life
advantest 0.452 0.212 0.321
all nipponairways 0.054 0.053 0.034
Belluna 0.673 0.514 0.474
canon 0.150 0.126 0.158
Eisai 0.075 0.069 0.054
hitachi 0.074 0.071 0.059
honda 0.044 0.023 0.022
kawasaki 0.666 0.267 0.347
kewpie 1.053 0.563 0.742
kobe steel 2.473 1.319 1.753
konami 1.541 0.617 1.396
kubota 0.014 0.026 0.010
kyocera 0.056 0.033 0.044
makita 0.994 0.391 0.937
minebea 1.234 0.414 1.201
mitsubishi 0.290 0.167 0.260
mitsubishi UFj Fin. 0.185 0.105 0.171
mitsui 0.434 0.243 0.427
nidec 0.084 0.038 0.074
nippon 0.529 0.246 0.424
nomura 0.797 0.292 0.684
ntt Docomo 0.785 0.351 0.706
olympus 0.893 0.294 0.681
orix 0.056 0.051 0.044
Panasonic 0.047 0.027 0.033
Ricoh 0.318 0.163 0.284
sekisui house 1.030 0.514 0.680
shiseido 1.447 0.572 1.328
sony 0.067 0.041 0.057
sumitomo metal 2.743 1.444 1.784
sumitomo trust 0.587 0.252 0.498
toyota 0.078 0.028 0.064
Wacoal 0.351 0.293 0.273
all stocks 0.614 0.212 0.486
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to converge to the no-adjustment bound. The premiums for firms with larger shareholders 
and earnings management take longer to converge to the no-adjustment bound.
As to the dummy variables, the convergence speed co-varies significantly negatively 
with merger activity, overseas subsidiaries, Level 2 or 3 A.D.R.s, N.Y.S.E. or Nasdaq mar-
ket exchange, and an A.D.R. effective date in the 1970s, at less than the 10% significance 
level. Only younger A.D.R. listings have an insignificant influence on the persistence of the 
premium outside of the thresholds. Regarding the industry classifications’ impact on finan-
cial integration, industrial and consumer goods industries are more financially integrated 
than other industries. The metals and mining industry is significant with a positive sign, 
Table 5. Results for a.R. half-life regressions in monthly data.a
athe standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
** and * represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
source: authors calculation.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Firm characteristics
Firm characteristics 
+ Corporate  
governance
Dummies variables 
only
Firm characteristics + 
Corporate governance 
+ Dummies variables
Firm characteristics Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E.
size −0.064** (0.022) −0.082** (0.029) −0.077** (0.026)
Growth −0.056** (0.025) −0.061** (0.028) −0.082** (0.031)
turnover −0.217** (0.093) −0.283** (0.101) −0.352** (0.119)
size*Growth −0.072** (0.025) −0.081** (0.031) −0.113** (0.039)
size*turnover −0.084** (0.041) −0.093** (0.044) −0.091** (0.045)
Growth*turnover −0.049** (0.021) −0.056** (0.027) −0.072* (0.041)
size*Growth* 
turnover
−0.017* (0.011) −0.026* (0.015) −0.032* (0.018)
R.o.E. −0.105** (0.043) −0.113** (0.047) −0.097** (0.041)
Leverage 0.134 (0.112) 0.179 (0.121) 0.206 (0.128)
Corporate  
governance
Large shareholders 0.229* (0.132) 0.241* (0.139)
institutional 
holdings
−0.117** (0.053) −0.132** (0.059)
Earnings  
management
0.265** (0.112) 0.307** (0.116)
Dummies
merger dummy −0.092* (0.056) −0.102* (0.059)
overseas dummy −0.122** (0.044) −0.141** (0.051)
industry dummy- 
industrials
−0.224** (0.103) −0.237** (0.107)
industry dummy- 
consumer goods
−0.169* (0.092) −0.151* (0.085)
industry dummy- 
metals and 
mining 
1.913** (0.229) 2.017** (0.233)
A.D.R. Features
a.D.R. type dummy −0.047* (0.026) −0.053* (0.031)
market dummy −0.325** (0.144) −0.402** (0.149)
Year dummy- 
effective in 1970s
−0.147* (0.081) −0.165* (0.088)
Year dummy- 
effective in 1990s
0.137 (0.92) 0.144 (0.960)
Control variables
a.D.R. size −0.036* (0.021) −0.042* (0.024) −0.037* (0.022) −0.067** (0.031)
a.D.R. liquidity −0.119** (0.053) −0.184** (0.067) −0.126** (0.057) −0.205** (0.072)
constant −0.332** (0.117) −0.514** (0.212) −0.447** (0.179) −0.661** (0.227)
adj. R2 0.227 0.263 0.204 0.319
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suggesting that this industry with a higher degree of premiums has longer half-lives. The 
metals and mining industry has a lowest level of financial integration. Fernandez (2009) 
notes that the mining industry is a complicated industry affected by political instability 
and energy industries. Hong et al. (2007) address that the metals and mining industry can 
forecast the market up to two months, because certain investors receive information orig-
inating from metals and mining only with a lag. Thus, we believe that the salient negative 
effect from the metals and mining industry is more likely to go from a risk and information 
asymmetry to a cross-listing premium. These results are robust to including A.D.R. size and 
A.D.R. liquidity as additional control variables.
Table 6 reports the results from the dependent variable of the estimated half-life in the 
Band-T.A.R. models, confirming the importance of firm-specific characteristics and corpo-
rate governance variables. The results highlight the need to account for firm-specific char-
acteristics in explaining a persistent premium. Firm size, growth, turnover, performance, 
institutional holdings, merger activity, overseas subsidiaries, Level 2 or 3 A.D.R., N.Y.S.E. 
or Nasdaq listing, and a longer A.D.R. listing history are significantly negatively related 
to half-lives, while large shareholders and earnings management converge more slowly to 
the half-lives. Except for leverage and younger A.D.R. listing, all variables are significant 
explanatory variables. The results from the Band-T.A.R. model not only confirm the results 
from A.R., but also suggest that the above results remain robust to the full model shown 
in Model (4) of Table 6. The additional control variables allow us to make inferences about 
the possibility impact from A.D.R. size and A.D.R. liquidity on financial integration. We 
find the larger the A.D.R. size and liquidity, the larger the degree of financial integration.
6.3. Determinants of thresholds
In this section, we test whether firm-specific characteristics, corporate governance, and 
A.D.R. features can explain threshold regimes. As shown in Model (1) of Table 7, only 
leverage cannot explain the threshold regime for firm-specific characteristics. That is, size, 
growth, turnover, R.O.E., and the interaction terms are significantly negative in explain-
ing the threshold regime. Other things being constant, larger size firms have a narrower 
threshold of no-arbitrage. An increase in the size decreases the threshold by 4.6% points 
in Model (4). Similarly, firms with larger growth, larger turnover, and larger R.O.E. have a 
narrower threshold of no-arbitrage. We believe the results are due to informativeness. In 
Model (4) of Table 7, the corporate governance variables in determining no-arbitrage bands 
remain highly significant after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics. An increase 
in larger shareholders increases the no-arbitrage threshold by 12.7% points, and an increase 
in earnings management increases the no-arbitrage threshold by 21.5% points, indicating 
larger shareholders and earnings management have wider thresholds of no-arbitrage. On 
the other hand, institutional holdings are significantly negatively related to the size of the 
thresholds by –17.7% points. Consistent with Gillan and Starks (2003), corporate monitoring 
by institutional holders enhances monitoring, decreases the no-arbitrage threshold, and 
increases the liquidity of the markets and price informativeness of the markets.
Merger activity and overseas subsidiaries dummies are also important in explaining 
threshold regimes. Merger activity increases the informativeness of a firm and thus decreases 
the no-arbitrage bands. Overseas subsidiaries dummies increase the reputation effect of the 
firm, thus decreasing the no-arbitrage band. As to the industry dummy in Model (3), the 
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industrial and consumer goods industry is significantly negative in determining no-arbi-
trage bands, while the metals and mining industry increases the no-arbitrage threshold by 
122.4% points. This is likely due to information asymmetry and risk being popular in the 
metals and mining industry.
Regarding the A.D.R. features, A.D.R. type, market exchange, and effective date, three 
kinds of dummy variables are used. In determining no-arbitrage bands, Level 2 or 3 A.D.R.s 
are significantly negative in explaining thresholds. The market exchange is also important 
in explaining thresholds – that is, N.Y.S.E. or Nasdaq exchange A.D.R.s show significantly 
Table 6. Results for band-t.a.R. half-life regressions in monthly data.a
athe standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 ** and * mean significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
source: authors calculation.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Firm characteristics
Firm characteristics 
+ Corporate  
governance
Dummies variables 
only
Firm characteristics + 
Corporate governance 
+ Dummies variables
Fir m  
characteristics Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E.
size −0.052** (0.023) −0.064** (0.025) −0.076** (0.029)
Growth −0.041** (0.019) −0.057** (0.021) −0.059** (0.027)
turnover −0.223** (0.096) −0.241** (0.094) −0.229** (0.090)
size*Growth −0.064** (0.029) −0.075** (0.028) −0.069** (0.025)
size*turnover −0.077** (0.031) −0.082** (0.033) −0.112** (0.039)
Growth*turnover −0.042** (0.019) −0.049** (0.017) −0.039* (0.023)
size*Growth* 
turnover
−0.022* (0.013) −0.027* (0.015) −0.031* (0.019)
R.o.E. −0.097** (0.036) −0.112** (0.038) −0.105** (0.035)
Leverage 0.104 (0.096) 0.101 (0.093) 0.096 (0.092)
Corporate  
governance
Large shareholders 0.192* (0.103) 0.200* (0.109)
institutional 
holdings
−0.105** (0.049) −0.124** (0.046)
Earnings  
management
0.176** (0.062) 0.228** (0.081)
Dummies
merger dummy −0.082* (0.047) −0.094* (0.051)
overseas dummy −0.091** (0.043) −0.103** (0.049)
industry dummy- 
industrials
−0.142** (0.056) −0.167** (0.059)
industry dummy- 
consumer goods
−0.132** (0.051) −0.124** (0.053)
industry dummy- 
metals and 
mining
1.667** (0.241) 1.796** (0.249)
A.D.R. Features
a.D.R. type dummy −0.032* (0.018) −0.041* (0.023)
market dummy −0.221** (0.101) −0.214** (0.104)
Year dummy- 
effective in 1970s
−0.162* (0.091) −0.178* (0.096)
Year dummy- 
effective in 1990s
0.124 (0.086) 0.135 (0.089)
Control variables
a.D.R. size −0.027* (0.015) −0.034* (0.019) −0.029* (0.016) −0.041* (0.023)
a.D.R. liquidity −0.092** (0.032) −0.104** (0.035) −0.101** (0.039) −0.126** (0.041)
constant −0.327** (0.145) −0.421** (0.147) −0.335** (0.148) −0.471** (0.151)
adj. R2 0.234 0.317 0.211 0.347
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lower thresholds, compared with A.D.R.s in the O.T.C. market. The effective date dummy 
shows that a long history of A.D.R. listings since the 1970s (i.e., Canon, Honda, and Sony) 
decrease no-arbitrage bands, while A.D.R. listings since the 1990s do not show any signifi-
cant relation with thresholds. Closer scrutiny suggests that all of the variables have the same 
results as in the full model and Model (1). Interestingly, the control variables (A.D.R. size 
and A.D.R. liquidity) have significant impact on financial integration, implying that A.D.R. 
features are as critical as firm-specific characteristics in explaining arbitrage opportunity.
Table 7. thresholds and determinants in monthly data.a
athe standard errors are reported in parentheses.
** and * mean significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
source: authors calculation.
Fir m  
characteristics
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Firm characteristics
Firm characteristics 
+ Corporate gov-
ernance
Dummies variables 
only
Firm characteristics + 
Corporate governance 
+ Dummies variables
Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E.
size −0.037** (0.017) −0.041** (0.019) −0.046** (0.021)
Growth −0.031** (0.015) −0.039** (0.016) −0.057** (0.023)
turnover −0.132** (0.053) −0.144** (0.057) −0.157** (0.061)
size*Growth −0.041** (0.021) −0.047** (0.023) −0.052** (0.025)
size*turnover −0.057** (0.022) −0.066** (0.026) −0.063** (0.021)
Growth*turnover −0.036** (0.015) −0.031** (0.011) −0.047** (0.018)
size*Growth* 
turnover
−0.022* (0.014) −0.036* (0.019) −0.039* (0.021)
R.o.E. −0.088** (0.041) −0.094** (0.044) −0.087** (0.040)
Leverage 0.102 (0.074) 0.114 (0.077) 0.117 (0.079)
Corporate  
governance
Large shareholders 0.122* (0.068) 0.127* (0.071)
institutional 
holdings
−0.152** (0.066) −0.177** (0.069)
Earnings  
management
0.204** (0.088) 0.215** (0.085)
Dummies
merger dummy −0.027* (0.015) −0.033* (0.018)
overseas dummy −0.084** (0.036) −0.095** (0.039)
industry dummy- 
industrials
−0.061** (0.029) −0.072** (0.031)
industry dummy- 
consumer goods
−0.105** (0.044) −0.113** (0.049)
industry dummy- 
metals and 
mining
1.224** (0.121) 1.216** (0.127)
A.D.R. Features
a.D.R. type dummy −0.037* (0.020) −0.031* (0.017)
market dummy −0.226** (0.096) −0.234** (0.099)
Year dummy- 
effective in 1970s
−0.142* (0.077) −0.157* (0.081)
Year dummy- 
effective in 1990s
0.122 (0.089) 0.134 (0.091)
Control variables
a.D.R. size −0.043* (0.025) −0.049* (0.027) −0.052* (0.029) −0.066* (0.036)
a.D.R. liquidity −0.137** (0.050) −0.144** (0.052) −0.147** (0.053) −0.152** (0.057)
constant −0.367** (0.122) −0.448** (0.131) −0.406** (0.133) −0.492** (0.139)
adj. R2 0.226 0.277 0.215 0.349
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6.4. Robustness checks
Weekly data were used to check the extent to which our empirical findings are robust. The 
results generated from the weekly data are not different from monthly data. Due to space 
limitations, we do not report the results of robustness checks. Nevertheless, the results for 
these tests are available from the authors on request.
6.5. Discussion
In sum, we employ the A.R. and T.A.R. models to calculate the convergence speed of a 
shock to the cross market premium as (inverse) measures of the degree of international 
financial integration (i.e., half-life) as well as threshold for the non-arbitrage band, sig-
nifying the cross-listing premium in A.D.R. can move between the negative and positive 
thresholds without any arbitrage taking place in the market. Thus, the negative coefficients 
of the variables represent an increase of the degree of international financial integration in 
Tables 5 and 6, and the negative coefficients of the variables in regression models represent 
a decrease of the threshold of no-arbitrage in Table 7. Our threshold, and half-life A.R. 
and Band-T.A.R. regression results present evidence that the larger the extent of earnings 
management is, and with more large shareholders, the larger the half-lives and no-arbitrage 
bands are. Specifically, earnings management and large shareholders increase the boundary 
of the no-arbitrage band, causing the premium to be, on average, positive. The higher the 
R.O.E. is and the larger are the size, turnover, and growth of the firms, the lower the devia-
tions from the L.O.O.P. and the smaller the no-arbitrage band will appear to be (integration 
appears to be stronger). In other words, a worse performance adds to transaction costs and 
weakens financial integration. Only the leverage ratio of all firm-specific characteristics 
seems to be insignificant.
Our empirical results significantly support Hypothesis 1 (the degree of financial integra-
tion is positively associated with firm size), Hypothesis 2 (the degree of financial integration 
is positively associated with firm growth), Hypothesis 3 (the degree of financial integration 
is positively associated with turnover), Hypothesis 4 (the degree of financial integration is 
positively associated with firm performance), Hypothesis 6 (the degree of financial integra-
tion is positively associated with large shareholder), Hypothesis 7 (Higher levels of financial 
integration are associated with a higher level of institutional shareholder), and Hypothesis 
8 (Higher levels of financial integration are associated with a lower level of earnings man-
agement), but not Hypothesis 5 (The degree of financial integration is negatively associ-
ated with corporate leverage). The results also indicate that the matter for Hypothesis 11 
(The degree of financial integration is negatively associated with the specific industries) of 
the association of financial integration can be demonstrated for specific industries, so do 
merger activities (Hypothesis 9: The degree of financial integration is positively associated 
with the presence of merger activity) and overseas subsidiaries (Hypothesis 10: the degree 
of financial integration is positively associated with overseas subsidiaries). Finally, we find 
support for the hypotheses that Levels 2 and 3 A.D.R.s (Hypothesis 12: The degree of finan-
cial integration is positively associated with Levels 2 or 3 A.D.R.s), N.Y.S.E. and Nasdaq 
listing A.D.R. (Hypothesis 13: The degree of financial integration is positively associated 
with N.Y.S.E.- and Nasdaq-listed A.D.R.s compared with those that are O.T.C.-listed), and 
longer history of A.D.R. (Hypothesis 14: The degree of financial integration is positively 
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associated with the history of ADR listing) integrate financially well, implying more liquid 
and longer history firms’ A.D.R.s have fewer arbitrage opportunities. Thus, the empirical 
results are not anomalous.
Our empirical evidence suggests the presence of the specific firm, corporate governance, 
industry, and A.D.R. impacts on the international financial integration between Japanese 
A.D.R. and their underlying firms. The findings are consistent for monthly and weekly as 
well as linear and non-linear empirical results. The evidence presented in this study suggests 
that Japanese stock-A.D.R. arbitrage can be characterised by the metals and mining industry, 
the presences of large shareholders and larger earnings management.
7. Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this study is to test for the linkages between financial integration and var-
ious firm-specific variables (such as firm characteristics, corporate governance, industry 
features, and A.D.R. characteristics), using 33 Japanese public firms that have A.D.R.s from 
October 2001 to September 2010. Our empirical results not only confirm the relationship 
between financial integration and various firm-specific variables, but also provide important 
implications for diversification.
First, our firm-level evidence shows that industry effects are important in explaining 
the variation of firm-level cross-listing premiums. For example, the converge speeds in 
cross-listing premium and no-arbitrage bands of the metals and mining industry is con-
siderably higher than other industries. The premiums of the metals and mining industry 
are saliently higher than its A.D.R. prices in our 9-year sample periods, contrary to the 
premiums of mobile and fixed-line telephone industry stocks. Second, in composing port-
folios and selecting individual equities, consideration should be given to the firm-specific 
characteristics and A.D.R. features, such as their level of global business, proportions of 
large shareholders, sales growth, turnover, performance, institutional holdings, and A.D.R. 
listing status. Finally, this study also has strong implications as firms especially seeking to 
list A.D.R.s to lower cost of capital could adjust their firm features and fuel their financial 
performance before globalised financial markets. Then, increased international financial 
integration promotes financial development and enhances economic performance in the 
countries, while decreasing arbitrage opportunities. Future research exploring factors influ-
encing financial integration of cross-listing will guide the decisions of financial managers, 
stock exchanges, and investors.
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